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Abstract: The general doctrine of vested rights protects developers from changes in 
zoning after they have received a valid building permit.  This article explains the two 
varieties of vested rights laws New York: statutory, and common law.  Also discussed, is 
a new proposal for vested rights legislation that would increase protection for 
developers over the existing laws.  The article closes by citing of some of the concerns 
with vested rights such as the single integrated project theory, losing vested rights by 
abandonment, and the equitable estoppel rule.   
 
*** 
 
Proposed Vested Rights Bill 
 
Currently before the New York State Assembly is legislation that would establish a 
rebuttable presumption that all local land use regulations affecting a particular parcel of 
land will remain applicable for six years following the submission of a complete site 
plan, subdivision, or other development plan application.1
                                                 
1 Assemb. 6023A, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007)(Sponsor’s memorandum); S. 3852, 2007 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2007). 
  For example, if parcel A 
requires 20 foot set backs and the owner applies for site plan approval, the setback 
requirements, as they apply to that application, cannot be amended by the municipality 
for six years.  A municipality may rebut this presumption by making one of three 
findings: (1) change in state or federal laws, rules or regulations; (2) newly discovered 
information or changes in circumstances related to the proposed project show that the 
project is likely to harm or endanger the public health, safety or biological habitat and 
that such harm will not be prevented by existing laws, codes, rules or regulations; (3) 
the municipal board is applying a new or altered requirement that has been the subject 
of a draft environmental impact statement that was filed before the land use application.   
The proposed bill, if passed, would not apply to “applications requiring changes in 
zoning provisions that are sought by the applicant in connection with the proposed 
project prior to the adoption of any such changes.”  If the applicant makes any 
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substantial changes (other than in response to comments), then the application will be 
considered a new application.   
 
Current Vested Rights Law 
 
Under current law, the doctrine of vested rights protects property owners from changes 
in zoning when they have received a valid building permit and have completed 
substantial construction and made substantial expenditures in reliance on the permit.  
The court in Ellington Construction Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, of the 
Incorporated Village of New Hempstead,2 determined that the New York rule for vested 
rights is “where a more restrictive zoning law is enacted, an owner will be permitted to 
complete a structure or development which an amendment has rendered 
nonconforming only where the owner has undertaken substantial construction and 
made substantial expenditures prior to the effective date of the amendment.”  The 
property owner must also have incurred expenditures and made improvements in 
reliance on the validly issued permit.  The rights must also vest after the issuance of the 
permit but before the zoning amendment becomes effective.3
 
  When a court finds that a 
property owner has vested rights to a validly issued permit, the effect is to immunize the 
approved project from all changes in zoning or other land use regulations.  This 
judicially created doctrine is called “common law” vested rights.   
In order to vest rights to the permit, the amount spent or the construction completed 
must be substantial in relation to the entire project.  In Riverdale Community Planning 
Ass’n v. Crinnion,4 the court ruled against a property owner who failed to show that the 
extent of completion of the excavation and the foundation constituted a substantial part 
of the entire project.  In Glenel Realty Corp. v. Worthington,5 the court held that the 
developer had acquired a vested right to complete a retail shopping center where it had 
almost completed the foundation work.  In Reichenbach v. Windward at Southampton,6
 
 
the court held that the property owner had not made substantial expenditures so as to 
vest rights to construct a motel prior to a zoning amendment that precluded motels.  The 
owner had spent $3,150 on footing and foundation work and $3,345 on plans and 
surveys for the project, but the total estimated cost of the motel project was $600,000.  
Thus, expenditures amounted to just over 1% of the estimated cost of the entire project 
– not enough to support a vested rights claim.   
                                                 
2 77 N.Y.2d 114, 566 N.E.2d 128, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1990). 
3See also Town of Lloyd v. Kart Wheelers Raceway, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 1015, 283 N.Y.S.2d 756 (3d Dep’t 
1967) (holding that vested rights were not established even though the new owner claimed that it had 
expended over $33,000 on new facilities); Smith v. Spiegel & Sons Oil Corp., 31 A.D.2d 819, 298 
N.Y.S.2d 47 (2d Dep’t 1969), aff’d, 24 N.Y.2d 920, 249 N.E.2d 763, 301 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1969) (holding 
that “the purchase of property, the demolition of structures thereon, and the retaining of architects to 
prepare plans was not work of a substantial character”). 
4 133 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1954), aff’d, 285 A.D. 1047, 141 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1st Dep’t 
1955).   
5 4 A.D.2d 702, 165 N.Y.S.2d 635 (2d Dep’t 1957). 
6 80 Misc. 2d 1031, 364 N.Y.S.2d 283, (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1975), aff’d, 48 A.D.2d 909, 372 N.Y.S.2d 
985 (2d Dep’t 1975). 
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The cost of the land, the demolition of existing structures, processing and consultant 
fees, or excavation work in preparation for construction is not enough to vest rights.  A 
court will not consider a particular expenditure unless there is a “special connection” 
between the expenditure and the approved use.  For example, in considering whether 
there had been substantial expenditures to entitle the completion of a mall, a court 
would not consider the expenditure of $120,000 to widen a road where the road would 
have had to be constructed to serve the residential development that was allowed under 
the amended law.7
 
 
There is also a more limited “statutory” vested rights rule in New York, adopted by the 
state legislature, which immunizes approved subdivision plats from changes in the 
dimensional or area requirements of zoning, but not use requirements, for a period of 
one to three years, depending on the circumstances.8
 
   Under the statutory protection 
provided to approved residential subdivisions, the landowner need not complete the 
entire subdivision during the prescribed period.  The entire project will be vested, 
however, if the landowner has met the judicially prescribed standard of substantial 
expenditure and investment during the period. 
The statutory grace period merely grants the developer a specified time in which to vest 
his rights.  If the developer fails to acquire vested rights within the prescribed time, then 
subsequent zoning requirements will apply to his property.9  In Ellington Construction 
Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, of the Incorporated Village of New Hempstead,10
 
 the 
zoning board of appeals argued that the statute afforded “protection only for those lots 
in a filed subdivision that an owner has completed or for which it has actually obtained a 
building permit during the exemption period.”  The court disagreed, holding that the 
statute “was intended to permit a developer to secure the right to complete a subdivision 
in accordance with existing zoning requirements by manifesting a commitment to the 
execution of the subdivision plan through completing improvements and incurring 
expenditures in connection therewith, during the exemption period, sufficient to 
constitute vesting under common-law rules.” 
Purpose 
 
There are dual purposes for the current doctrine of vested rights.  One is to protect the 
investment of landowners who have made significant expenditures and completed 
significant construction in reliance on a valid land use permit.  When landowners have 
undertaken substantial construction and expenditure, they are no longer subject to 
zoning changes; this protects the owner’s investment from confiscation.  The second is 
to preserve municipal authority to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community.  The New York vested rights rule gives local governments some flexibility to 
                                                 
7 Town of Hempstead v. Lynne, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526, (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961). 
8 Town Law § 265-a, Village Law § 7-709, and General City Law § 83-a. 
9 Freundlich v. Town Board of Southampton, 73 A.D.2d 684, 422 N.Y.S.2d 215 (2d Dep’t 1979), aff’d, 52 
N.Y.2d 921, 419 N.E.2d 342, 437 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1981).   
10 77 N.Y.2d 114, 566 N.E.2d 128, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1990). 
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change the rules to protect the public from the time a permit has been issued until a 
substantial investment under that permit has been made.   
 
If the proposed bill is passed, local governments’ flexibility will be severely limited and 
applicants will have increased protection from changes in land use regulations.  The 
justification for the proposed bill is to protect property owners who have invested money 
in an application before and after the review process from having their project derailed 
by a change in zoning.  “[M]unicipal action which changes the rules midstream, when it 
is not based on legitimate concerns, constitute an impairment of a property owner’s 
rights by preventing the owner from having the liberty to use his land, it often devalues 
the property and causes substantial additional expenses to the property owner.”11
 
 
Application of Current Law in Recent Case 
 
In Exeter Building Corp. v. Newburgh, the court held that the applicant acquired 
statutory vested rights when it was granted a lot-line change, and thus could pursue the 
development of its property under the prior zoning regulations.12
 
   On March 6, 2006, 
Town of Newburgh enacted Local Law No. 3 (2006) which rezoned residential R-2 and 
R-3 areas to residential R-1. This law affected the property owned by Exeter in such a 
way that it would no longer be possible for Exeter to develop the property as a 
condominium complex as it had intended.  The appellate division held that although 
Exeter had failed to establish “substantial improvements and expenditures” to support 
its claim of common law vested rights, it had established statutory vested rights under 
Town Law § 265-a when it sought and received a lot-line change from the planning 
board. The lot-line change constituted a “subdivision” within the meaning of Town Law § 
276(4)(a) and Town of Newburgh Code § 163-2, and therefore Exeter had statutory 
vested rights and was immunized from the zoning change for a period of three years 
following the subdivision approval.  Under the new bill, Exeter’s rights would have 
vested at the time it filed its application and thus Local Law No. 3 would not have 
applied to Exeter’s application. 
Limitations and Concerns of Current Vested Rights Law 
 
Rights Will Never Vest Under an Invalid Permit  
 
A landowner’s rights will never vest under an invalidly issued permit.  The doctrine of 
vested rights assumes that the property owner acted in justifiable reliance on a validly 
issued permit.  Property owners should insure that they have a valid permit before 
claiming vested rights.  In Parkview Associates v. City of New York,13
                                                 
11 Assemb. 6023A, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007)(Sponsor’s memorandum). 
 the developer was 
issued a building permit to construct a 31-story building.  The applicable zoning, which 
allowed a maximum of 19 stories, was misinterpreted by the builder and the City 
12 Exeter Building Corp v. Town of Newburgh.  2008 WL 740561 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 2008 N.Y. Slip Op 
02586.  
 
13 71 N.Y.2d 274, 519 N.E.2d 1372, 525 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1988). 
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Department of Buildings.  When the mistake was realized, construction was nearly 
complete.  The court sustained the city’s order to demolish 12 stories because the 
“original permit in this case was invalid inasmuch as it authorized construction  . . . in 
violation of [the] New York City Zoning Resolution.”  The property owner’s argument that 
the City should be estopped from enforcing the law because of the department’s 
mistake and the nearly completed construction was not successful. 
 
The Single Integrated Project Theory 
 
Where a developer completes one or more phases of a development, vested rights to 
the entire project may accrue. Where the later stages of the project have not been 
substantially constructed but the developer has made substantial project improvements 
in earlier project stages that support and benefit later stages, a court may find that rights 
to the entire development have vested.  In Telimar Homes, Inc. v. Miller,14
 
 the court held 
that a zoning law amendment that required a minimum lot size of one half acre as 
opposed to a quarter acre did not apply to the plaintiff.  The builder had been granted 
approval to subdivide the land into quarter-acre lots.  Following this approval, 
construction of roads began, “plans were prepared and model homes were built . . . all 
on the basis that it was a single over-all project.”  The court concluded that because 
substantial construction had commenced and substantial expenditures had been made, 
the builder had “acquired a vested right to a nonconforming use as to the entire tract.”   
In Schoonamaker Homes v. Village of Maybrook,15
 
 a planning board granted 
subdivision approval for property that was to be divided into separate sections for 
apartments, townhouses, and single-family residences.  The townhouse and single-
family sections of the project were developed.  Twenty years later, when the developer 
applied for building permits to construct the apartments, the village amended its zoning 
law to decrease the density permitted for apartments and denied the permits because 
the application did not meet these new requirements.  The developer challenged the 
denial based on the single integrated project theory.  Under this theory, a developer 
who seeks approval for a project to be constructed in several stages has vested rights 
to the entire project even if the later stages of the construction have not been started 
where substantial infrastructure construction on the first phases serves the later stage.  
The court held that the developer had acquired vested rights to develop all apartment 
units, but that the developer had abandoned those rights during the 20-year delay; overt 
acts of abandonment by the developer were shown. 
Losing Vested Rights by Abandonment 
 
Property owners may lose vested rights by abandonment.  The court may find that a 
landowner has abandoned his vested rights if the completion of the project is delayed 
for a long period and there is some overt act implying that the developer has abandoned 
the vested rights.  For abandonment of vested rights, there must be intent to abandon in 
                                                 
14 14 A.D.2d 586, 218 N.Y.S.2d 175 (2d Dep’t 1961). 
15 178 A.D.2d 722, 576 N.Y.S.2d 954 (3d Dep’t 1991). 
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addition to an overt act implying that the developer is abandoning his vested rights.16   
In 202 Developers, Inc. v. Town of Haverstraw,17 the court rejected the town’s argument 
that the developer had lost its right to develop certain property because it “did nothing to 
develop the property for eleven years after it gained site approval.”  There was no overt 
act or other evidence of intent to abandon other than the passage of time.  To determine 
if a zoning board’s conclusion that vested rights have been abandoned is valid, the 
court must consider whether the conclusion was based on “substantial evidence.”18
 
   
Equitable Estoppel Rule 
 
A community may encounter difficulties if an owner is prevented, by arbitrary delaying 
tactics, from obtaining a valid building permit and vesting his rights under it.  In such a 
case, the municipality may be prevented from applying the changed regulations and 
denying an owner a permit under the previous regulations.  The issue in Pokoik v. 
Silsdorf,19
 
 was whether, because of improper actions of municipal officials, the petitioner 
was entitled to an order directing the issuance of a permit.  Plaintiff had wanted to build 
a two-bedroom addition to his four-bedroom house.  The application was denied and 
plaintiff appealed.  While the appeal was in process, the local legislature amended its 
zoning law to limit one-family homes to four bedrooms.  The final denial was based on 
this amendment.  The court found repeated abuses by certain municipal officials in their 
treatment of the plaintiff’s application and that the reasons for denying the earlier permit 
applications were meritless.  It held that it was “abundantly clear that at all times prior to 
the effective date of the amendment the petitioner was entitled to a permit.”  The court 
concluded that the delay in this case was a “special facts exception” to the rule that “a 
case must be decided upon the law as it exists at the time of the decision,” and 
therefore “the zoning law as amended, [did] not apply and the arbitrary action of the 
board may not prevail.” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Putnam Armonk, Inc. v. Town of Southeast, 52 A.D.2d 10, 382 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep’t 1976).   
17 175 A.D.2d 473, 573 N.Y.S.2d 517 (3d Dep’t 1991). 
18 See Schoonamaker Homes v. Village of Maybrook, 178 A.D.2d 722, 576 N.Y.S.2d 954 (3d Dep’t 1991).   
19 40 N.Y.2d 769, 358 N.E.2d 874, 390 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976). 
